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THE CONCEPT OF ATTORNEY-FITNESS
IN NEW YORK: NEW PERSPECTIVES
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A
fair private and professional character is one of them. Compliance
with that condition is essential at the moment of admission; but it is
equally essential afterwards. . . . Whenever the condition is broken,
the privilege is lost.1
INTRODUCTION
The certification of attorneys to practice law by admission to
state bars is generally held to depend on their academic credentials,
legal training and moral character.2 In New York, this was made ex-
plicit by the court of appeals in its statement that "the practice of law
is not a business open to all, but a personal right, limited to a few
persons of good moral character, with special qualifications ascertained
and certified after a long course of study .... -"3 Of the three areas of
qualification, obviously, the requisite moral character is the most
difficult to judge, much less define, with uniform certainty. Yet, it is
this facet which has the greatest potential effect on the conduct of
attorneys and applicants to the bar.
A good moral character is both a condition precedent to the in-
itial admission of attorneys4 and a continuing requirement for the
retention of that status.5 To enforce this requirement, most states have
given broad discretion to their courts to admit and retain only those
deemed "fit" for the legal profession. State statutes commonly pre-
scribe the minimal standards for admission and the continuation of
membership in the bar. However, it is always within the courts' pre-
rogative to develop and enforce additional criteria for the determina-
tion of "fitness." 6
New York's statutory provisions regarding admission to the bar
leave undefined the "character and general fitness requisite for an at-
1. In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 84-85, 116 N.E. 782, 783, cert. denied, 246 U.S.
661 (1917).
2. In re Brennan, 230 App. Div. 218, 219, 243 N.Y.S. 705, 706 (2d Dep't 1930).
3. In re Cooperative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 483, 92 N.E. 15, 16 (1910).
4. Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Konigsberg v. State Bar,
353 U.S. 252 (1957).
5. In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 116 N.E. 782, cert. denied, 246 U.S. 661 (1917);
In re Cohen, 7 N.Y.2d 488, 166 N.E.2d 672, 199 N.Y.S.2d 658, aff'd 366 U.S. 117
(1960).
6. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1960).
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torney and counsellor-at-law," 7 thereby authorizing broad judicial dis-
cretion. Under New York law, however, determinations of post-admis-
sion fitness are less subject to judicial discretion. For example, disbar-
ment is automatic on an attorney's conviction for a felony offense.8 In
fact, the felony disbarment rule in this state is far more rigid than that
of many other states; generally disbarment depends on whether the
crime involved moral turpitude In contrast, the New York rule man-
dates disbarment for any felony regardless of its moral character.
As opposed to the mandatory treatment of felony offenders, courts
in this state are authorized to censure, suspend or disbar attorneys who
are "guilty of professional misconduct, malpractice, fraud, deceit,
crime or misdemeanor, or any conduct prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice."'1 For the determination of post-admission fitness,
therefore, the courts have discretion to define unfitness only for lesser
offenses; the disbarment for felony offenses requires no judicial ac-
tion."1
In terms of the definition of fitness, therefore, the application
and scope of judicial discretion in non-felony contexts is far more im-
portant than felony cases since each determination refines to some
extent the moral character required of an attorney in this state. Clearly,
judicial determinations of fitness affect all attorneys presently practic-
ing in New York since their conduct must conform to that standard
in order to avoid discipline or disbarment. Furthermore, since the im-
plicit rule is that only those considered fit under these standards will
be considered for initial admission to practice, the concept of fitness
also has a potential affect on each prospective attorney as well.
The recent court of appeals decision discussed in this Comment,
In re Kimball,2 dealt with the judicially defined concept of fitness as
it relates to one's sexual misconduct, criminal record and prior dis-
barment. Through an analysis of that case and others preceding it in
7. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 90(1) (a) (McKinney 1968).
8. Id. § 90(4), which reads: "Any person being an attorney and counsellor-at-law,
who shall be convicted of a felony, shall, upon such conviction, cease to be an attorney
and counsellor-at-law, or to be competent to practice law as such."
9. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 16 (1957); WAsHr. REV. CODE § 2.48.220
(1951).
10. N.Y. JUDIcLARY LAw § 90(2) (McKinney 1968).
11. Barash v. Association of Bar, 20 N.Y.2d 154, 157, 228 N.E.2d 896, 898, 281
N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000 (1967) (citations omitted).
12. 33 N.Y.2d 586, 301 N.E.2d 436, 347 N.Y.S.2d 453, rev'g per curiam 40 App.
Div. 2d 252, 339 N.Y.S.2d 302 (2d Dep't 1973).
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this jurisdiction, a fuller explication of the meaning of "fitness" will
be developed. In particular, this Comment will address the issue of
whether past or present conduct should be the focal point of the deter-
mination of fitness in admission and post-admission contexts.
IN RE KIMBALL: THE FACTS AND ,DECISION
In 1953, Harris Kimball gained admission to the Florida bar. For
four years, he engaged in the active practice of law until his disbar-
ment for "an act contrary to good morals and the law."' 3 The circum-
stances of that act took place in 1955. In Orlando, Florida, on a sum-
mer evening, Kimball was arrested and charged with violating a city
ordinance prohibiting "indecent and lewd acts in a public place."' 4
The evidence was inconclusive as to exactly what occurred; it was un-
disputed that Kimball and a male companion had been swimming in
the nude, but Kimball denied that any other act took place. Neverthe-
less, a court-appointed referee in the disbarment proceeding, which
was eventually brought, found the evidence sufficient to establish that
the two men were engaged in an act of sodomy when apprehended on
the public beach.
Following the advice of counsel, Kimball posted and forfeited bail
to the lewdness charge which, he was led to believe, would result in
its reduction to "misconduct."' 5 The charges were not reduced, how-
ever, and the records show only that Kimball forfeited bail, the equiva-
lent of a plea of nolo contendere, 8 to the original charge.
On the basis of that incident, a member of the Florida bar
charged Kimball with demonstrating a disregard for the laws and
morals of the state and unfitness to continue to practice in that juris-
diction. After testimonial hearings, the referee recommended disbar-
ment on the ground that Kimball had committed at act of sodomy.17
13. Florida Bar v. Kimball, 96 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1957).
14. ORLANDo, FLA., ORDINANCES § 62.40 (since repealed). Note that the appellate
division originally cited the applicable statute as 'FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.01" in its
recording of the facts; it corrected the error in In re Kimball, 41 App. Div. 2d 780,
342 N.Y.S.2d 373 (2d Dep't 1973).
15. Brief for Appellant at 7, In re Kimball, 33 N.Y.2d 586, 301 N.E.2d 436, 347
N.Y.S.2d 453 (1973).
16. Laws of 1939, cl. 19554, § 69, as amended FLA. STAT. ANN. § 903.26(6)
(1973), reads, in pertinent part: "The payment . .. of a forfeiture under the provisions
of this law shall have the same effect on the bond as payment of a judgment."
17. Note that the proof applicable in disciplinary proceedings of attorneys need not
meet the criminal standards as long as the adjudicatory body is convinced that the act
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The board of governors of the Florida bar concurred with the findings
and recommendation of the referee. After the required lapse of time
for appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida formally ordered his dis-
barment.' 8
On November 30, 1971, 14 years after his disbarment in Florida,
Harris Kimball was certified as having passed the New York State
bar examination. Because of his prior disbarment, however, a sub-
committee of the committee on character and fitness was assigned the
task of determining his fitness. As a result of this inquiry, in which
all of the evidence of the Florida disbarment proceeding was intro-
duced, the subcommittee unanimously held that Kimball possessed
the requisite character and fitness to practice law in New York "not-
withstanding the admission of the applicant to being homosexual and
having engaged in homosexual acts."'19 They did not, however, recom-
mend admission. Similarly, the full committee on character and fitness
unanimously concurred that Kimball possessed all the necessary
qualifications for admission, but concluded that New York statutes
and prior case law precluded his admission. In particular, the commit-
tee determined that the case of In re Peters20 and section 90(5) of the
New York Judiciary Law combined to create a policy that one dis-
barred in another state could not be admitted to the bar of New York
State unless first readmitted in the bar of the foreign jurisdiction.
Peters dealt with a similar, yet distinguishable, application for ad-
mission to the New York bar. In Peters, as in Kimball, the applica-
tion followed a disbarment in a foreign state. In both cases, the appli-
cant passed the New York State bar examination and was found to. be
fit by the committee on character and fitness. In Peters, however, the
court refused the applicant's admission stating that a prior disbar-
ment was a "badge of unfitness," 2' the validity of which is assumed.
Though it stated that the rationale for denying admission was to
avoid establishing the precedent of admitting attorneys previously dis-
barred, the court implied that its decision and the forcefulness of its
dictum was due, at least in part, to that particular applicant's unre-
occurred and that it demonstrates the offending attorney's unfitness. In re Kass, 39 App.
Div. 2d 352, 334 N.Y.S.2d 54 (2d Dep't 1972).
18. Florida Bar v. Kimball, 96 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1957).
19. In re Kimball, 40 App. Div. 2d at 253, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 303.
20. 250 N.Y. 595, 166 N.E. 337 (1929), aff'g 221 App. Div. 607, 225 N.Y.S. 144(1927).
21. 221 App. Div. at 608, 225 N.Y.S. at 145.
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lenting criticism of the Alabama courts and judges for their disbarment
proceeding. This, the court believed, further demonstrated his unfit-
ness.
22
The appellate division, upon receiving the committee's report con-
cerning Kimball, held that Peters did not preclude his admission to
the New York bar. Peters, it stated, held only that admission to the
New York bar is not a right, but a privilege, and cannot be acquired
by one's claim that a prior disbarment was void. In other words, the
strong dictim of the Peters decision could not properly be applied to
all applicants previously disbarred.
Similarly, section 90(5) of the New York Judiciary Law was held
not to preclude the admission of Kimball because it was correctly
interpreted by the court as being limited in effect to those applicants
who were pardoned after being disbarred in foreign jurisdictions for
the commission of crimes. In that event, the statute23 requires that the
applicant be readmitted to the foreign state bar before the pardon can
operate to justify admission to the bar of this state. Clearly, as the
court observed, this limitation on its scope made the section inappli-
cable to Kimball who was never pardoned for his alleged offense. It is
interesting to note that the statutory section seems to require a higher
standard for the admission of disbarred attorneys who were pardoned
than for disbarred attorneys, like Kimball, who were never pardoned.
The appellate division's finding that Kimball's admission to
practice was not prevented by established state law did not, however,
decide the issue. Indeed, the court developed the rdle that "[w]here
we find that we would have disbarred the attorney on the same facts,
the applicant should be required to be readmitted in the first State
before he may be admitted by us to the Bar of our State."24 Accordingly,
the appellate division denied Kimball's application for admission to
the New York bar because, from its reading of the facts, his act con-
stituted sodomy which was a felony in New York at the time it was
committed.2 5 If he were a New York attorney when the act occurred,
22. Id.
23. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 90(5) (McKinney Supp. 1974) reads, in pertinent
part: "[I]f such attorney or counsellor-at-law has been removed from practice in
another jurisdiction, a pardon in said jurisdiction shall not be the basis for application
for re-admission in this jurisdiction unless he shall have been re-admitted in the juris-
diction where pardoned."
24. 40 App. Div. 2d at 254, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 305.
25. See Law of March 12, 1909, ch. 88, § 690 [1909] Laws of New York, as
amended N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.38 (McKinney 1967).
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he would, presumably,. have been automatically disbarred and could
not have been readmitted unless he was pardoned or his conviction was
reversed.26 Therefore, the court reasoned, his initial admission to the
New York bar could not be justified until or unless he was first re-
admitted to the Florida bar.
The court of appeals, 27 in reversing the appellate division decision
in this case, based its determination on two grounds largely ignored
in the court below. First, it held that Kimball's past conduct was rele-
vant, but not controlling, in the determination of fitness for admission.
The court reasoned that, though "violative of accepted norms," 28
his avowed sexual preference did not, in and of itself, justify a find-
ing of unfitness for the practice of law. The court followed the tradi-
tional approach in bar admission cases by relying heavily on the de-
termination of fitness made by the committee on character and fit-
ness.-9
Secondly, the court stated that it concurred with the dissenting
opinion in the appellate division in its treatment of the Florida dis-
barment. In that dissent, it was asserted that, regardless of a prior
disbarment, the New York courts are free to exercise their independent
judgment of the applicant's fitness at the time he applies. The dissent
argued that it was inconsistent for the majority to hold that it was free
to exercise an independent judgment of fitness while, at the same time,
denying admission to an applicant who was found to be fit at the
present time.
The basic tenet endorsed by the court of appeals was that an ap-
plicant for admission to the New York bar must be judged by current
standards, on the basis of his or her present fitness. Though the court's
minimization of Kimball's alleged offense might have been prompted
by a greater tolerance towards homosexuality, it implied that prior
felonious conduct, unrelated to homosexuality, would be merely rele-
vant and not controlling in its determination.
The dissenting opinion in the court of appeals argued that where
26. N.Y. JuniciARY LAw § 90(5) (McKinney Supp. 1974), which reads, in
pertinent part: "Upon a reversal of the conviction for felony of an attorney and
counsellor-at-law, or pardon by the president of the United States or the governor of
this or another state of the United States, the appellate division shall have the power
to vacate or modify such order or debarment."
27. Note that the decision in the court of appeals was per curiam.
28. 33 N.Y.2d 584, 301 N.E.2d 435, 347 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1973).
29. See, e.g., Spears v. State Bar, 211 Gal. 183, 294 P. 697 (1930).
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there was a finding that the applicant committed sodomy in the past,
the denial of the application was warranted, regardless of the appli-
cant's present fitness. The dissent also asserted that the persistent viola-
tion of any criminal statute gives the courts the authority to deny the
offender admission to the bar. The applicant's admission to being
homosexual, the dissent argued, established that he regularly com-
mitted the misdemeanor of "consensual sodomy."30
Whether or not this conclusion is fair, the theory on which it was
based can co-exist with the majority's holding in which the applicant's
sexual conduct was considered relevant, albeit minimally, to the de-
termination of present fitness. The major points of conflict between
the majority and dissenting opinions in the courts of appeals, there-
fore, revolved around the issues of whether past or present conduct
should be the focal point of the fitness inquiry and whether past or
present legal and ethical standards should be used to judge it.
NEW YoRK's COMMON LAW TREATMENT OF
DETERMINATIONS OF ArrORNEY-FITNEss
To appreciate the significance of the Kimball decision, some dis-
cussion of the prior decisions on attorney-fitness in New York is re-
quired. Before doing so, however, it is helpful to note that there are
four basic grounds for the inference of unfitness needed to justify disci-
pline of attorneys. They are: (1) felony convictions; (2) misdemeanor
or minor offense convictions; (8) violations of the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics; and (4) other conduct which, though not punishable
by law, evidences a disregard for the responsibilities of the profession.
Under certain fact situations, each type of impropriety can result in
an order of disbarment. Generally, the severity of the disciplinary ac-
tion parallels the courts' judgment of the seriousness of the conduct in
terms of fitness.
As noted above, attorneys are automatically disbarred upon convic-
tion of a felony offense.31 In addition, the court of appeals has held
30. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.38 (MeKinney 1967).
31. E.g., Barash v. Association of Bar, 20 N.Y.2d 154, 228 N.E.2d 896, 281 N.Y.S.
2d 997 (1967); Devine v. Association of Bar, 19 N.Y.2d 592, 224 N.E.2d 740, 278
N.Y.S.2d 238 (1966); In re Liddy, 41 App. Div. 2d 422, 343 N.Y.S.2d 710 (1st Dep't
1973); In re Piazza, 39 App. Div. 2d 541, 331 N.Y.S.2d 737 (2d Dep't 1972); In re
Thaler, 40 App. Div. 2d 7, 337 N.Y.S.2d 264 (lst Dep't 1972).
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that a reversal of a felony conviction does not entail automatic rein-
statement.3 2 In these cases, the court will use its discretion to assess all
of the circumstances, including the reason for the reversal, to determine
whether the attorney would present a danger to his clients or the
public if reinstated.3 3 Furthermore, an out-of-state or foreign convic-
tion for a crime cognizable as a felony under New York law (even if
considered less serious in the foreign jurisdiction) has been held to be
sufficient justification for the application of the automatic disbarment
rule.34 This result is due to the fact that New York's statute"3 does not
spbcify which state law is to be used to determine the felony status
of a crime committed out of state.3 6
The statutory provision punishing lesser offenses, 37 including mis-
demeanor convictions, grants discretion to the courts to authorize cen-
sure, suspension or disbarment. The court of appeals has held, how-
ever, that a conviction for a misdemeanor is prima facie proof of
unfitness to practice law. 38 However, attorneys may litigate the issue of
fitness in this situation, since "fairness and justice suggest that there
be a wide range of inquiry as to facts which have a bearing on the ulti-
mate issue of appellant's fitness to continue as a member of the Bar."3 0
The third area of conduct for which disciplinary action is justified
under New York common law involves violations of the Canons of
Professional Ethics. In ohe case, the prohibition against the advertise-
ment of law firms in the canons40 was interpreted broadly to include an
32. In re Cassidy, 296 N.Y. 926, 73 N.E.2d 41 (1947).
33. Barash v. Association of Bar, 20 N.Y.2d 154, 228 N.E.2d 896, 281 N.Y.S.2d
997 (1967).
34. In re Yore, 37 App. Div. 2d 290, 324 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Ist Dep't 1971).
35. N.Y. JuDIcIAlY LAW § 90(4) (McKinney 1968).
36. Id. For the text of this statute, see note 8 supra.
37. Id. § 90(2), which reads, in pertinent part: "[T]he appellate division of the
supreme court in each department is authorized to censure, suspend from practice or
remove from office any attorney and counsellor-at-law admitted to practice who is
guilty of professional misconduct, malpractice, fraud, deceit, crime or misdemeanor, or
any conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice...."
38. Keogh v. Richardson, 17 N.Y.2d 479, 214 N.E.2d 163, 266 N.Y.S.2d 984
(1965).
39. Id. at 481, 214 N.E.2d at 164, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
40. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, No. 27, which reads, in pertinent
part: "It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by circulars, advertise-
ments, through touters or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by
personal relations. Indirect advertisements for professional employment such as furnish-
ing or inspiring newspaper comments . . .offend the traditions and lower the tone of
our profession and are reprehensible ...."
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article written in a popular magazine about a law firm in which com-
plimentary references were made about particular firm members.4'
Although the article was independently written and was meant to de-
pict the rigors of a corporate law practice, the court found that the
law firm partners had violated the canon by their cooperation and
acquiescence in the author's research. It held that "any substantial
breach . . . thereof is considered as professional misconduct"' which,
as noted previously, may be disciplined by censure, suspension or dis-
barment.43
Another closely related, yet separate ground for discipline of at-
torneys is conduct which, though not subject to criminal or civil sanc-
tions, demonstrates an irresponsibility deemed contrary to the stand-
ards of the profession and the concept of fitness. Particularly when the
conduct involves moral turpitude, the appellate division has held that
the focus 'of the disciplinary proceedings should not be whether the
attorney has been proven guilty under the rules of evidence applicable
in civil or criminal courts but whether the conduct demonstrates his
or her professional unfitness.44
The same criterion is applied in the discipline of attorneys for
sexual misconduct, which can be the factual basis for any of the four
disciplinary grounds. In one case, an attorney used his position to lure
women into his law office, presumably for the purpose of conducting
interviews for secretarial positions. Instead, the attorney asked highly
personal questions and eventually attempted to molest the job appli-
cants.45 In disbarring the attorney, the court stated that this conduct,
even if not criminally punishable, justified disbarment because it
tended to bring reproach upon the legal profession in addition to
demonstrating the attorney's unfitness to conform to the responsibili-
ties of the practice of law.
One of the earliest cases of this kind involved an attorney who
wrongfully retained money held by him for several clients and also
committed adultery on a regular basis with one client's wife.46 Though
the attorney was disbarred, it is unclear whether he would have been
41. In re Connelly, 18 App. Div. 2d 466, 240 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1st Dep't 1963).
42. Id. at 469, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
43. See N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 90(2) (McKinney 1968).
44. In re Kass, 39 App. Div. 2d 352, 334 N.Y.S.2d 54 (2d Dep't 1972).
45. In re Gould, 4 App. Div. 2d 174, 164 N.Y.S.2d 48, motion for leave to appeal
denied, 4 App. Div. 2d 833, 166 N.Y.S.2d 301 (1st Dep't 1957).
46. In re Titus, 66 Hun. 632, 21 N.Y.S. 724 (2dDep't 1892).
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so severely disciplined solely for his adultery. A prior case, cited by the
court, had indicated that disbarment would not necessarily follow
from mere sexual misconduct. It stated that "to warrant a removal,
the character must be bad in such respects as shows the party unsafe
and unfit to be intrusted with the powers of the profession. There are
many vices that render the character more or less bad, that have no
such tendency." 47
Thus, the willingness of the courts of this state to disbar attorneys
for sexual misconduct cannot be characterized in a definitive rule.
The view that sexual conduct may be among those vices which do not
justify disbarment or a determination of unfitness is implied by the
Kimball result. A contrary result was reached in a prior case, however,
in which it was held that a ten-year-old conviction on a charge of
"lewdness or indecency" did justify disbarment.48 Though the factual
basis for the charge in that case is unrecorded, it is significant that,
prior to Kimball, the type of conduct criminalized by a "lewdness"
statute49 resulted in the disbarment of a New York attorney.
It is important to note that, in prior cases, the inquiry in de-
terminations of attorney-fitness was focused primarily (if not exclu-
sively) on the offending act rather than the person and his continued
ability to function as a legal professional. Kimball, therefore, repre-
sents a significant development in two respects. First, the fitness in-
quiry has changed its focus; it is no longer based solely on past conduct
or behavior patterns. The primary point of reference is now the ap-
plicant's or attorney's present fitness, as judged by current legal and
ethical standards, which takes into account primarily present fitness
and abilities, and, to a much lesser degree, his or her past behavior.
Secondly, the Kimball decision refines the concept of fitness: past crim-
inal conduct, prior disbarments and the active practice of homosex-
uality cannot be considered obstacles to admission to practice if the ap-
plicant is otherwise considered fit.
Interpreted in this way, the Kimball result parallels a recent de-
velopment in the law with regard to the relevance of homosexuality
47. In re Percy, 36 N.Y. 651, 654 (1867).
48. In re Fleckenstein, 27 App. Div. 2d 184, 277 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1st Dep't 1967).
49. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 115-1 (1969), which provides: "Any person who com-
mits open lewdness or a notorious act of public indecency, grossly scandalous and tend-
ing to debauch the morals and manners of the people, or in private commits an act of
lewdness or carnal indecency with another, grossly scandalous and tending to debauch
the morals and manners of the people, is guilty of a misdemeanor."
ATTORNEY-FITNESS
and other unpopular private behavior in determinations of fitness made
in other contexts. Though not explicitly directed to the issue of homo-
sexuality, this development-the "nexus requirement"-has also been
applied in bar admission cases.
THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT
Until quite recently, government employees and teachers, among
others, were regularly dismissed from employment on the basis of a
finding that they were presently engaging in homosexual activity, or
had done so in the past. The inference, either implicity or explicitly
drawn, in each case was that homosexuality demonstrated a psycholog-
ical problem, a potential security risk or moral unfitness for the posi-
tion at issue.50 Recently, however, numerous cases have begun to re-
flect a change in judicial reasoning on this issue paralleling a growing
public and scientific awareness that such inferences are fallacious.51
Though the approach is not yet universal, 52 the following cases exem-
plify this trend.
In Norton v. Macy,53 a government employee was dismissed un-
der the statutory justification, which reads: "[F]or such cause as will
promote the efficiency of the service."5 4 The underlying reason for
his dismissal as a NASA employee was contradicted evidence that he
was homosexual and had solicited homosexual activity. In dealing with
50. For an interesting discussion of the traditional justifications for the discrimina-
tion against homosexuals, see W. BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION
108-12 (1973).
51. Note that the American Psychiatric Association has removed homosexuality
from its list of mental disorders. AMz. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTI-
CAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1970). Note also the finding of the Na-
tional Institute of Mental Health, Task Force on Homosexuality, that "[a]lthough many
people continue to regard homosexual activities with repugnance, there is evidence that
public attitudes are changing. Discreet homosexuality, together with many other aspects
of human sexual behavior, is being recognized more and more as the private business of
the individual rather than a subject for public regulation by statute. Many homosexuals
are good citizens, holding regular jobs and leading productive lives." Cited in W.
BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 128 (1973).
52. E.g., Adams v. Laird, 420 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Schlegel v. United
States, 416 F.2d 1372 (Ct. Cl. 1969). These cases held that, where employees have
access to classified information, the fact of their homosexuality is sufficient in itself to
establish the necessary causal connection with their employment-effectiveness to justify
their dismissal.
53. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
54. 5 U.S.C. § 7512 (Supp. IV, 1969).
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this issue, however, the court imposed a "nexus requirement:" the
government-employer must demonstrate a reasonable causal connec-
tion between the offending conduct and the "efficiency of the service"
before dismissing employees on this basis.55 In the absence of any
such nexus, it was held to be a denial of due process to dismiss an
individual solely on the basis of his sexual preference.
The view that homosexuality per se cannot be considered indica-
tive of unfitness was part of the basis for Morrison v. State Board of
Education,6 in which the nexus requirement was imposed on a school
board in determining fitness to teach. The court held that:
[T]he Board of Education cannot abstractly characterize the conduct
in this case as "immoral," "unprofessional," or "involving moral tur-
pitude" . . . unless that conduct indicates that the petitioner is unfit
to teach. In determining whether the teacher's conduct thus indicates
unfitness to teach the board may consider such matters as the likeli-
hood that the conduct may have adversely affected the students or
fellow teachers, the degree of such adversity anticipated, the proxim-
ity or remoteness in time of the conduct, the type of teaching certifi-
cate held by the party involved, the extenuating or aggravating cir-
cumstances, if any, surrounding the conduct, the praiseworthiness or
blameworthiness of the motives resulting in the conduct, and the ex-
tent to which disciplinary action may inflict an adverse or chilling
effect upon the constitutional rights of the teacher involved or other
teachers. 57
The holding of In re Labady5s evidences the same sort of scrutiny
of determinations of fitness based solely on sexual preference. In this
case, which dealt with the naturalization of an avowed homosexual,
the court upheld the alien's right to be admitted on the ground that
homosexuality is not indicative of a lack of the "good moral charac-
ter" required for American citizenship. Addressing the relevance of
the alien's sexual preference, the court commented that "private con-
duct which is not harmful to others, even though it may violate the
personal moral code of most of us, does not violate public morality
which is [our] only concern. .. ."59 Citing Griswold v. Connecticut,00
55. 417 F.2d at 1165.
56. 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
57. Id. at 229, 461 P.2d at 386, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 186 (footnotes omitted).
58. 326 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
59. Id. at 927-28.
60. 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965).
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the court argued that "it is now established that official inquiry into
a person's private sexual habits does violence to his constitutionally
protected zone of privacy."' 1 Therefore, in the absence of any nexus
or causal connection between the applicant's private conduct and his
"ability to be 'law-abiding and useful' to society," 62 the alien must
satisfy the moral character test if otherwise considered fit. The court
also referred to a decision in which Justice Learned Hand asserted
"the test [in determining good moral character] is not the personal
moral principles of the individual judge or court before whom the
applicant may come; the decision is to be based upon what he or
it believes to be the ethical standards current at the time. ' 6 3
Similar objections to a subjective test for fitness have led to the
use of a form of the nexus requirement by the Supreme Court in two
bar admission cases. In Konigsberg v. State Bar .of California,4 in
which the applicant's refusal to answer certain questions of the char-
acter committee was held by the lower courts to impugn his fitness,
the Supreme Court held that it could not be so interpreted. It stated
that the concept of fitness is "a vague qualification, which is easily
adapted to fit personal views and predilections, [and which] can be a
dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the
right to practice law."6 5 In the companion case, Schware v. Board of
Examiners,6 the Court articulated the nexus requirement in stating
that "[a] state can require high standards of qualifications, such as good
moral character or proficiency in its laws, before it admits an appli-
cant to the Bar, but any qualifications must have a rational connec-
tion with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law. '' 67 In both
cases, the Court endorsed the view that the inquiry into an applicant's
fitness in bar admission cases should be focused on present fitness as
it affects the capacity to practice law. Evidence of past conduct or un-
popular present behavior, therefore, is only relevant insofar as it is
causally related to the applicant's potential to fulfill the demands and
responsibilities of the legal profession.
61. 326 F. Supp. at 927.
62. Id. at 928.
63. Posusta v. United States, 285 F.2d 533, 534-35 (2d Cir. 1961).
64. 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
65. Id. at 263.
66. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
67. Id. at 239.
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CONCLUSION
Though not explicit in the Kimball decision, the "nexus" reason-
ing must have led, at least in part, to its result. The minimal relevance
afforded to Kimball's sexual preference and behavior, which are unre-
lated to his abilities as a lawyer, demonstrates an implicit exercise of
the nexus principle. Of course, the effect of Kimball could be limited
to the particular fact situation it represents. It is unlikely that it was
meant by the court to enunciate a broad policy, and it is possible that
it will not be treated as such. However, the argument of this Comment
is that the Kimball decision is far more desirable as a policy for this
state in bar admission cases than many of the cases preceding it, in
which the determinations of fitness were based primarily on past con-
duct with little or no reference to the particular individual and his or
her ability to practice law in the future. Evidence of past and present
criminal behavior is certainly relevant to the determination of fitness,
inasmuch as it demonstrates an attitude towards the law. But, as with
homosexuality in other employment situations, it is the applicant's
present fitness as judged by current, enlightened standards which
should predominate in deciding fitness. And, as indicated by the Su-
preme Court in Schware and Konigsberg,68 only present conduct ra-
tionally related to the capacity to practice law should even be con-
sidered in bar admission determinations of fitness.
The purpose of bar admissions and the requirement of fitness is,
after all, to insure that only capable applicants are chosen for and re-
tained in the bar. Since an applicant's capability as a lawyer is not
affected in any way by his or her past conduct or private sexual activity,
and since the profession and the public are represented only by each
attorney's legal skills and integrity, the determination of fitness in bar
admissions and post-admission contexts should not involve those aspects
of an applicant's character which are not causally related to his or her
potential to practice law in a capable fashion. While the holding of
Kimball may be limited to its particular facts, its result, and the
Schware69 decision, dearly stand for this principle.
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68. See text accompanying notes 64-67 supra.
69. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
